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Affirmative Action,
Race, and the Constitution:
From Bakke to Grutter
BY ROBERT A. SEDLER*
W hen law schools and medical schools first adopted race-conscious
admission policies in the middle- I960s, their primary purpose for
doing so was not to obtain a racially diverse student body. Rather, the
primary purpose was to increase the representation of African-Americans
and other racial minorities such as Hispanics and Native-Americans in the
legal and medical professions, where they were seriously under-
represented.' In order to increase the number of minority lawyers and
* Distinguished Professor of Law and Gibbs Chair in Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, Wayne State University. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
The author was Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky from 1966 to 1977.
During that time the author litigated a number of racial discrimination cases as a
cooperating lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky. The most
significant ones were the Louisville-Jefferson County metropolitan desegregation
case, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Education of Jefferson County,
Kentucky, 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated by Board of Education v.
Jefferson County, 418 U.S. 918 (1974); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Gordon,
521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975); and the Fayette County desegregation case, Jefferson
v. Board of Education of Fayette County, Kentucky, 344 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ky.
1972).
' As of 1970, although over eleven percent of the national census population
was black, African-American males constituted only 1.2% of the nation's male
lawyers and judges and 2.0% of its male physicians and dentists. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 407-08 tbl.662 (1977). The Bureau of the Census did not bother to compile
figures for female lawyers, judges, physicians, or dentists. See id. at 407-08 tbl.662,
31 tbl.35. In 1970, while there was one lawyer for every 637 persons, there was
only one African-American lawyer for every 7000 African-Americans, and at that
time fewer than 4000 of the 300,000 lawyers in the country were African-
American. See Martin H. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the
Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 343, 389 nn.194-95 (1974). At that time, when I and my colleagues in the
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doctors at that time, it was absolutely necessary for the law schools and
medical schools, which controlled entrance into these professions, to adopt
race-conscious admissions policies. For reasons directly traceable to the
consequences of the long and tragic history of racial discrimination in this
nation, there was an enormous economic gap between racial minorities as
a group and whites as a group,2 which in turn led to an educational gap
between racial minorities as a group and whites as a group.3 This unpleas-
ant and undisputed fact, coupled with the fact that in the aggregate there
were many more white applicants than minority applicants competing for
places at a particular law school or medical school, meant that if race were
not affirmatively taken into account in the admissions process, relatively
few minority students would have been admitted at most law schools and
ACLU of Kentucky were looking for African-American lawyers to work on civil
rights cases, we concluded that there were no more than 20 African-American
lawyers in Kentucky, in varying degrees of active law practice. Those who were
engaged in active law practice were mostly solo practitioners and were mostly in
Louisville. As to the shortage of Hispanic lawyers, see Cruz Reynoso, La Raza, the
Law and the Law Schools, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 809, 814-16. In California, as of
1967, the ratio of white lawyers for whites was one for every 530; for Spanish-
surnamed lawyers to Spanish-surnamed citizens, it was one for every 9482. Id. at
816. As to the very small number of American Indian lawyers, see Rennard
Strickland, Redeeming Centuries ofDishonor: Legal Education and the American
Indian, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 847, 861-66. As of 1974, there was one physician for
every 750 persons in the general population, but only one African-American
physician for every 3500 African-Americans. See Robert M. O'Neil, Racial
Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925, 943-
44 (1974). In the entire country there were only 250 Chicano and 56 American
Indian physicians. Id.
2 The data are discussed in Robert A. Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution
and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133,
138-39 nn.21-27 (1979).
3Id. at 136-38 nn. 15-20. For a review of the data showing the persistence of the
economic and educational gap in the early 1980s, see Robert A. Sedler, The
Constitution, Racial Preference, and the Equal Participation Objective, in
SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE CoNsTrUTION, EQUALITY, AND RACE 123,
139-42 nn.17-19 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Sedler, Equal Participation]. In 1983, after some years of affirmative action,
African-Americans constituted nearly twelve percent of the United States
population, but only 2.7% of the lawyers and judges, 3.2% of the physicians, 2.9%
of editors and reporters, and 4.4% of college and university teachers in the United
States were African-American. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 380 tbl.593 (2001)
[hereinafter 2001 CENSUS ABSTRACT].
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 221
medical schools.4 This was the stark reality of the situation a generation ago
when Regents of the University of California v. Bakke came before the
Supreme Court.5
In Bakke, neither the university nor, to the best of my recollection, any
of the numerous proponents of affirmative action in their amicus curiae
briefs,6 tried to justify affirmative action on diversity grounds. Rather, the
thrust of the arguments in support of the university's affirmative action
program was that the state's interest in overcoming the present conse-
quences of past societal discrimination against racial minorities was
compelling. The university and amici further argued that a reasonable racial
quota, such as allocating to minorities sixteen of the one hundred seats in
the entering class of the medical school of the University of California at
Davis, was narrowly tailored to advance that interest. This was the position
taken by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun in Bakke, and
it led them to conclude that the Davis Medical School's use of race in
determining admissions was constitutional.7 Four other Justices, in an
opinion by Justice Stevens, took the position that Title VI prohibited any
use of race in admissions by universities receiving federal funds, and so
these Justices held that the medical school's admissions program violated
Title VI.' This left it up to Justice Powell to cast the deciding vote.
It is clear in retrospect that the Powell opinion for the Court in Bakke
resolved a number of issues relating to the constitutional permissibility of
race-conscious affirmative action and represents the holdings of the Court
on these issues today. Powell's resolution of these issues constituted
' This situation is discussed at length in Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference,
Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329,345-55 (1977) [hereinafter Sedler, Racial Preference].
The minority students admitted to law schools and medical schools under
affirmative action programs at that time, like the minority students admitted under
affirmative action programs today, are fully qualified in the sense that they have
sufficiently good grades and LSAT/MCAT scores that they are likely to success-
fully complete the course of study at that law school or medical school. Selective
admissions means in the literal sense that the school selects which of the qualified
applicants will be admitted.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
6 The author was the principal author of the amicus curiae brief for the Society
of American Law Teachers in Bakke. The arguments in the brief were based on the
position set forth in Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 4, at 361-80.
7 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-79 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
8 Id. at 411-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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holdings in the case itself when his views were supported by four other
Justices either in the "Brennan four" or "Stevens four" opinions; also, some
of the dicta in Powell's opinion became law when they were affirmed by
a Court majority in subsequent cases. In any event, the following proposi-
tions emerged from the Powell opinion in Bakke and were established
constitutional doctrine at the time of Grutter-Gratz.
One: The test under Title VI for the permissible use of race in
university admissions is the same as the constitutional test, so whatever is
permitted or prohibited for a public university as a constitutional matter is
also permitted or prohibited under Title VI for a private university
receiving federal funds.9
Two: Strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications benefitting racial
minorities in the same manner as it applies to racial classifications
disadvantaging racial minorities."
9 Powell and the "Brennan four" agreed on this point. See id. at 285-86. This
was the point on which the "Stevens four" dissented. See id. at 325 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
'0 In Bakke, the University argued, as had some commentators, that when the
white majority "discriminated against itself' for a "benign purpose," strict scrutiny
should not apply. Id. at 294. Justice Powell decisively rejected this argument and
held that strict scrutiny applied in equal measure to discrimination against racial
minorities and discrimination against whites. Id. at 295. He stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not embody a "two-class theory," and that this being
so, "the difficulties entailed in varying the level ofjudicial review according to a
perceived 'preferred' status of a particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable."
Id. He went on to point out that "there are serious problems of justice connected
with the idea of preference itself." Id. at 298. These were that: (1) "it may not
always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign;" (2) "preferential
programs may only enforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are
unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no
relationship to individual worth;" and (3) "there is a measure of inequity in forcing
innocent persons in respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances not of their making." Id. at 298. Justice Powell then concluded as
follows:
If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifica-
tions based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his
membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may be
applied consistently .... When they touch upon an individual's race or
ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden
he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.
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Three: Overcoming the present effects of societal discrimination
against racial minorities is not a compelling governmental interest
justifying governmental action benefitting racial minorities and disadvan-
taging whites.
Four: Overcoming the present effects of identified unlawful racial
discrimination for which the government agency itself is responsible is a
Id. at 299. In one application of strict scrutiny in Bakke, Powell found insufficient
the medical school's proffered justification of admitting minority students in order
to improve the delivery of health care services to currently underserved minority
communities. He found that there were "more precise and reliable ways to identify
applicants who are genuinely interested in the medical problems of minorities than
by race." Id. at 311. Powell's conclusion on this point illustrates the application of
the "narrowly tailored" component of strict scrutiny. The medical school could not
justify its use of race in determining admission by making the seemingly reasonable
assumption that in the aggregate minority students were more likely than whites to
end up practicing in currently underserved minority communities. It had to identify,
without regard to race, an individual applicant "who has demonstrated his concern
for disadvantaged minorities in the past and who declares that practice in such a
community is his primary professional goal." Id. At the same time, the Court has
sought to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (citing Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)). The Court noted, "The unhappy persistence
of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not
disqualified from acting in response to it." Id.
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court, in a 5-4
decision, held that benign racial classifications on the part of the federal govern-
ment were subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Id. at 564-65.
That holding was overruled in Adarand, and it is now clear that all governmental
racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-27.
" This was the point of disagreement between Powell and the "Brennan four"
in Bakke. Powell specifically took the position that overcoming the present effects
of societal discrimination was not a compelling governmental interest for
constitutional purposes. Powell referred to societal discrimination as "an
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past." Bakke,
438 U.S. at 307. He argued that approving this rationale would risk placing
unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties "who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to
have suffered." Id. at 310. He also noted that in the absence of findings of
constitutional or statutory violations, the Court has "never approved a classification
that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals. .. ." Id. at 307.
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compelling governmental interest justifying the use of narrowly tailored
race-conscious criteria. 12
In light of the third proposition of the Powell opinion in Bakke, the
primary justification that the university and the proponents of affirmative
action had set forth for the university's race-conscious admissions policy
could not stand. There also was no claim that the policy was designed to
remedy prior identified discrimination in the admission of minorities to the
medical schools, and such a claim would have been very difficult to
maintain.13
This brings us to the diversity justification. The Powell opinion found
that a university's interest in enrolling a racially diverse student body was
a compelling governmental interest for constitutional purposes, justifying
some consideration of race in the admissions process. 4 However, Justice
Powell also found that the university's use of a racial quota-reserving
12 As Powell stated in Bakke: "The State certainly has a legitimate and
substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling
effects of identified discrimination."Id at 307. Similarly, as Justice O'Connor has
stated: "The Court is in agreement that, whatever the formulation employed,
remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently
weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286
(1986).
"3 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10. The medical school had been operating for
only two years and based admission primarily on grades and MCAT scores.
Because grades and test scores are neutral factors, a university's use of these
factors to determine admissions is not unconstitutional despite the foreseeable
disparate impact it will have on minority applicants. Id. Cf Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that, although an employment screening criterion had
a disproportionate adverse effect on minorities, it was not used as a device of
discrimination).
"4 Powell saw this interest as being supported by First Amendment academic
freedom values and referred to it as a "countervailing constitutional interest... [of]
paramount importance in the fulfillment of [the university's] mission." Bakke, 438
U.S. at 313. He said that universities must be "accorded the right to select those
students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas"' and went
on to note:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified
medical student with a particular background-whether it be ethnic,
geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged-may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks and ideas that enrich
the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render with
understanding their vital service to humanity.
Id. at 313-14.
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sixteen places out of one hundred for minority students-was not necessary
to promote diversity and in fact would "hinder rather than further attain-
ment of genuine diversity."' 5 Powell maintained that "[t]he diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element."' 16 He insisted that each applicant's
qualifications must be weighed "fairly and competitively," with the
"competitive consideration of race or ethnic origin."' 7 Powell also noted,
however, that the university can "pay some attention to the numbers" in
order to ensure that there is substantial minority representation in the
student body.'8 He cited the Harvard College program as an "illuminating
example" of a permissible use of race in admissions. 9 While the "Brennan
four" would have preferred to rest their approval of the program on the
university's interest in overcoming the present effects of past societal
discrimination, they agreed (albeit in a footnote) with Powell's position in
order to bring about a holding of the Court on this issue.2"
As a practical matter, Bakke settled the question of the constitutional
permissibility of race-conscious university admissions. The Constitution
permitted universities to adopt admissions programs that included the
"competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin" as one of the factors
151d. at 315.
16 Id.
17Id. at 318, 320.
18 Id. at 323.
'
9 Id. at 316.
20 "We also agree... that a plan like the 'Harvard' plan.. . is constitutional...
at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is
necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination." Id. at 326 n.1
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The effect of the agreement
between Powell and the "Brennan four" on this point was a holding that there could
be some consideration of race in the admission process in accordance with the
guidelines of the Powell opinion. As a result, that part of the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California holding that there could be no consideration of race
in the admission process was reversed. Id. at 272. On the other hand, five Justices,
Powell on constitutional grounds, and the "Stevens four" on the basis of their
interpretation of Title VI, found the Davis program illegal, and the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California was affirmed insofar as it enjoined the operation of
the Davis program and ordered the admission of Bakke to medical school. Id. at
271. The Powell opinion is also considered to set forth the holding of the Court on
the issue of the permissible use of race in admissions, because the opinion
represents the "position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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in determining admission.2' After Bakke, universities revised their race-
conscious admissions programs to comply with the approach set forth in the
Powell opinion and justified their consideration of race in determining
admissions as advancing a university's compelling interest in attaining
educational diversity.22 While the pre-Bakke justification-4he strong
public interest in increasing the number of minority lawyers and
doctors--remained a major motivation for law school and medical school
race-conscious admissions programs, the constitutionality of these
programs could now be sustained under the different educational diversity
justification.23 Similarly, following Bakke, most universities adopted
programs taking race into account in all undergraduate, graduate school,
and professional school admissions, and today racial diversity has become
a hallmark of the university scene. This is all due to Justice Powell's going
beyond the arguments of the parties in Bakke and invoking the educational
diversity justification for race-conscious admissions programs.
The fourth proposition of the Powell opinion in Bakke--that there is a
compelling governmental interest in overcoming the present effects of
identified unlawful racial discrimination for which the government agency
itself is responsible-justifies what may be called remedial affirmative
action. Whenever a governmental agency has engaged in unlawful racial
discrimination, it has the affirmative duty to take remedial action to
eliminate the present effects of its past discrimination. 24 When it fails to
21 As the Court stated in Grutter: "The only holding for the Court in Bakke was
that a 'State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin."' Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2336 (2003) (citing Bakke,
438 U.S. at 320).22 See Howard Lesnick, What Does Bakke Require ofLaw Schools? The SALT
Board of Governors Statement, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 141 (1979). As the Court
observed in Grutter: "Since this Court's splintered decision in Bakke, Justice
Powell's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public
and private universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions
programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-conscious policies."
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2336.
23 For a discussion of the public interest in what I have called the equal
participation of racial minorities in the legal and medical professions, see Sedler,
Equal Participation, supra note 3, at 131-33.
24 The Powell opinion in Bakke illustrates this requirement by citing the school
desegregation cases, such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board ofEducation,
402 U.S. I (1971), which held that school districts that had been segregated under
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satisfy this duty, a court, upon finding the existence of unlawful racial
discrimination, can impose a race-conscious remedy. For example, there
has been a long history of racial discrimination by cities and states in the
hiring and promotion of police officers and firefighters. In order to
overcome the present consequences of this identified unlawful discrimina-
tion, the courts can impose an affirmative hiring and promotional remedy,
which typically requires the hiring or promotion of one minority person for
one white person until a designated minority percentage of minority
persons has been reached.2 5
And since a governmental agency has the affirmative duty to take
remedial action to eliminate the present effects of its identified unlawful
discrimination, it can do so voluntarily by adopting a race-conscious
affirmative action plan, such as the one-to-one hiring and promotion
programs instituted by police departments to remedy past racial discrimina-
tion in hiring and promotion. When such an affirmative action program is
challenged by adversely affected whites, the government can successfully
defend by showing that it had a strong basis in evidence for finding that
the department had engaged in past racial discrimination, and that the
state law prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), had the
affirmative duty to desegregate the pre-Brown segregated schools, and until that
duty was satisfied, to prevent any other schools from becoming racially identifi-
able. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); United States v.
City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1974). The courts may also impose such remedies against private
employers and labor unions found to have engaged in illegal employment
discrimination in violation of federal law. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). It should be noted that in these cases the
beneficiaries of the program are not the individual victims of the identified past
discrimination, and that the effect of the program will be to provide a benefit for
minority persons as a group over white persons as a group. As Justice Brennan
noted in Bakke: "Such relief does not require as a predicate proof that recipients of
preferential advancement have been individually discriminated against; it is enough
that each recipient is within a general class of persons likely to have been the
victims of discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Similarly, as former ChiefJustice Burger stated in Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,484 (1980), where the Court upheld a remedial minority
business enterprise set-aside: "It is not a constitutional defect in this program that
it may disappoint the expectations of non-minority firms. When effectuating a
limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination,
such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible."
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program is narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of that discrimi-
nation.26
In the years following Bakke, the Supreme Court exhibited what I have
referred to as an institutional ambivalence about race-conscious affirmative
action.27 At first the Court appeared to be giving the federal government
somewhat greater leeway than the states in enacting race-conscious
affirmative action programs, based on Congress' implementing power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court has now
expressly held that strict scrutiny applies equally to racial classifications by
the federal government and by the states.28 In other decisions, the Court
26 This is the test set forth by the Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In that case, the Court held that the city failed
to make a showing of past discrimination by the city against minority contractors,
with the result that the city's minority business enterprise program was unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 510. In a number of cases the courts have found past discrimination
by police and fire departments, particularly at an earlier time, and have upheld
affirmative action plans directed at remedying that discrimination. See, e.g., Detroit
Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979) (in that case, the
author filed an amicus curiae brief for New Detroit, Inc., a Detroit civic association
formed to promote racial equality); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th
Cir. 1983); Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2000); McNamara
v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998); Boston Police Superior Officers
Fed'n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1998).
'7 See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution, Racial Preference, and the Supreme
Court's lnstitutionalAmbivalence: Reflections on Metro Broadcasting, 36 WAYNE
L. REv. 1187 (1990) [hereinafter Sedler, Institutional Ambivalence].
28 In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court, in a 6-3 decision,
upheld a 10% minority business enterprise set aside mandated in a Congressional
grant to state and local governments for public works projects. Id. at 491-92. The
purpose of the set-aside was to overcome the present consequences of identified
past discrimination against minority business enterprises in government contracts,
and the Court emphasized deference both to Congressional findings of past
discrimination and to Congressional determination of the appropriate remedy. Id.
at 467. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that racial classifications on the part of the federal government
were subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. Id. at 600-01.
Applying the lower standard, the Court upheld the FCC minority ownership
policies, providing some preference to racial minorities in an effort to increase the
very .small percentage of minority-owned broadcasting facilities. The Court
majority found that the federal government's interest in "broadcast diversity" was
"important" and that the Commission's minority ownership policies were
"substantially related" to the advancement of that interest. Id. A few years later, in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Court overruled
[VOL. 92
2003-2004] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 229
reaffirmed the proposition in the Powell opinion that overcoming societal
discrimination is not a compelling governmental interest; these decisions
also defined more fully the operation of the "overcoming identified past
discrimination" interest. 2' Finally, in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,30 which in retrospect appears to be the Title VII equivalent of
Bakke, the Court held that, consistent with Title VII, private and govern-
mental employers could adopt race-conscious employment policies
designed to increase the employment of minority persons in job categories
in which they were traditionally underrepresented.3'
We see then that as a result of Bakke and subsequent cases, a substan-
tial amount of race-conscious affirmative action was found to be constitu-
tionally permissible. There could be court-ordered race-conscious hiring
and promotion programs to remedy identified past discrimination in
employment by governmental and by private employers. Governmental
Fullilove on the issue of the applicable standard of review, and specifically held
that racial classifications on the part of the federal government are subject to the
same strict scrutiny as such classifications on the part of state and local govern-
ments. Id. at 226-27. So, if another case involving minority broadcast ownership
preference were to come before the Court, the Court would have to decide whether
the asserted interest in "broadcast diversity" was compelling, and if so, whether the
particular form of the preference was narrowly tailored to the advancement of that
interest.
29 The government must show that it has a strong basis in evidence for finding
the existence of identified past discrimination. In addition, it must make this
showing for each racial or ethnic group included in the preference. And it must
show why race-neutral means will not be sufficient to remedy the present
consequences of past discrimination. These requirements emerge from the various
opinions adding up to a majority of the Court in City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1986), at least four Members of the Court held that out-of-line seniority layoffs
could not be used for any purpose, including overcoming the present effects of a
state agency's own identified past discrimination. Id. at 282-83, 294-95. I have no
doubt that the Court would and should so hold if faced with this question in the
future. The burden on adversely affected whites from a loss of seniority is simply
too severe and in practice is likely to fall on particular individuals. See Sedler,
InstitutionalAmbivalence, supra note 27, at 1199-1205. Finally, the Court has held
that the courts can impose a race-conscious hiring or promotional remedy upon
governmental bodies, and upon private employers and labor unions, in order to
remedy their identified past discrimination. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986).
3oUnited Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
3' Id. at 208.
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agencies could voluntarily adopt race-conscious affirmative action
programs to remedy the present consequences of their identified past
discrimination. And universities could adopt race-conscious admissions
programs in order to attain educational diversity.
The end result of a quarter-century of race-conscious affirmative action
has been a substantial increase in the equal participation of African-
Americans and other racial minorities in important areas of American life.
The primary purpose for the adoption of these policies was not to provide
educational diversity in the classroom, but instead to increase the represen-
tation of racial minorities in the legal and medical professions, where they
were seriously underrepresented. 2 Because of race-conscious admission
policies in law schools and medical schools, the representation of racial
minorities in these professions has substantially increased, both in terms of
percentages and more importantly in terms of numbers.33 Turning first to
the legal profession, we see that it is a very different profession from what
it was a generation ago. Minority lawyers serve as judges, prosecutors, and
law professors. They are lawyers for the government, "members of the
firm," and bar association officers. They are in a position to contribute
directly to the American legal system, to make the system responsive to the
needs of minority persons, and to build the confidence of the minority
persons in the legal system and the administration of justice precisely
because minority lawyers are an integral part of that system.34
So too when we look at the medical profession, we see that there has
been a substantial increase in the number of minority doctors,35 so that it
32 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
" According to Census Bureau data, in 1983, five years after Bakke was
decided, 2.7%, or 17,577 of the nation's 651,000 lawyers and judges were black,
and 1.0%, or 6510, were Hispanic. In 2000, 5.7%, or 52,782 of the nation's
926,000 lawyers and judges were black, and 4.1%, or 37,966, were Hispanic. 2001
CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 380 tbl.593.
" In Grutter, Justice O'Connor, citing the amicus curiae brief submitted by the
Association of American Law Schools, pointed out the influence of lawyers in the
American political system. "Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the
state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more
than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives." Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
35 According to Census Bureau data, in 1983, five years after Bakke was
decided, 2.7%, or 19,845 of the nation's 735,000 health diagnosing professionals
(including, among others, doctors and dentists) were black, and 3.3%, or 24,225,
were Hispanic. In 2000, 5.2%, or 53,976 of the nation's 1,038,000 health
diagnosing professionals were black, and 3.4%, or 35,292, were Hispanic. 2001
CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 380 tbl.593. For some unexplained reason, the
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also is a very different profession from what it was a generation ago.
Minority doctors are now in a position to bring a "minority perspective" to
the operation of the healthcare delivery system. Physicians do much more
than treat patients. They serve on hospital staffs and medical committees.
They take part in decisions that affect the kind of medical services that will
be offered and the cost of those services. They influence the distribution of
medical resources and the location of healthcare facilities. They perform
substantially the same function with respect to the healthcare delivery
system that lawyers perform with respect to the legal system and the
administration of justice. As a result of race-conscious admission policies
in the nation's medical schools, minority doctors now participate more fully
in the operation of healthcare.
Following Bakke, race-conscious admissions policies were adopted by
most universities across the board and resulted in a substantial increase in
the number of minority students attending and graduating from what may
be called the traditionally white universities. We have thus seen a marked
increase in the number of minority college graduates and consequently in
the number of teachers, business executives, journalists, professors, and
members of other professions. As a nation, we are now moving closer
toward reaching a truly diverse society in which racial minorities will be
full and equal participants with whites in all important areas of American
life.
In addition, while the aggregate economic gap and resultant educational
gap between African-Americans and Hispanics in comparison to whites
remains, 36 there has been some increase in the size of the African-American
and Hispanic middle class.37 The increase in the size of the African-
number and percentage of Hispanic physicians and dentists relative to the number
and percentage of black physicians and dentists was higher in 1983 than in 2000.
36 According to Current Population Survey figures, the 2001 median income of
households by race and national origin was as follows: white-$44,517; black-
$29,470; hispanic origin-$33,565; Asian and Pacific islander-$53,635. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2001, 4 tbl. 1 (2002). According to U.S. Census Bureau data in 1999, the
high school graduation rates for persons eighteen years and over by race and
hispanic origin were as follows. High school graduation: white-84.3%;
black-77%; hispanic-56.1%; Asian and Pacific islander--84.7%. Bachelor's
degree or higher: white-25.9%; black- 15.4%; hispanic-10.9%; asian and
pacific islander-42.4%. 2001 CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 139 tbl.249.
3' The increase in the size of the middle class is reflected in the number and
higher incomes of married couple families compared to other kinds of family
households and nonfamily households. According to the U.S. Bureau of the
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American and Hispanic middle class has resulted in improved educational
opportunities for an increased number of minority children who come from
advantaged homes and attend good schools.
Because there are now more minority students with good academic
credentials, the need to take race into account in order to achieve substan-
tial minority representation is most pronounced only at the more "elite"
universities and professional schools, such as the University of Michigan.
It is contended by opponents of race-conscious admissions policies that if
such policies were absolutely prohibited across the board, there would be
Census, the 2001 median income for 4,233,000 black married couple families was
$51,357, compared to $34,540 for 773,000 male-headed households, $22,059 for
3,838,000 female-headed households, and $20,610 for 4,470,000 nonfamily
households. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Tables of Income By
Detailed Socioeconomic Characteristics tbl. 1 (2003), at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/income/incomeOl/inctabl.html. The 2000 median income of 5,778,000
hispanic married couple families was $40,942, compared to $35,544 for 817,000
male-headed households, $23,567 for 1,922,000 female-headed households, and
$22,141 for 1,982,000 non-family households. Id. The 2001 median income for
44,117,000 white married couple families was $63,999 compared to $44,057 for
2,618,000 male-headed households, $32,786 for 6,884,000 female-headed
households, and $26,240 for 27,200,000 non-family (single-member) households.
Id. The figures show that overall black household income is $29,470, overall
hispanic household income is $33,565, and overall white household income is
$46,305, so that overall black household income is 63.6% of overall white
household income, and overall hispanic household income is 72.5% of overall
white household income. Id. Among married couples, the gap decreases for Blacks.
Black married couple income ($51,357) is 80.2% of white married couple income
($63,999). However, hispanic married couple income ($40,942) is 64% of white
married couple income. Id.
In 2000, among 2,276,000 blacks 45 to 49 years old, 19.5% had a bachelor's
degree or higher; among 1,709,000 blacks 50-54, the figure was 21%. Bureau of
the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Percentage of High School and College
Graduates of the Population 15 Years Old and Over tbl. Ia (2001), at http://www.
census.gov/population/socdemo/education/p20-536/tab01.txt. Among 1,580,000
hispanics 45 to 49 years old, 12.7% had a bachelor's degree or higher; among
1,438,000 hispanics 50-54, 13.2% had a bachelor's degree or higher. Id. For whites
the figures are as follows: among 19,748,000 whites 45 to 49 years old, 33.2%
have a bachelor's degree, and among 16,882,000 whites 50 to 54 years old, 32.7.%
have a bachelor's degree or higher. Id. As these figures indicate, while a much
higher percentage of whites in these age groups have a bachelor's degree or higher,
a significant percentage of blacks also have a bachelor's degree or higher. The
hispanic percentage is not as high, reflecting perhaps a higher percentage of recent
immigrants in these age groups.
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fewer minority students at the "elite" institutions, but minority students
would "cascade down" to institutions at the next level, where their
academic credentials would be the same as those of the white students who
were applying for admission.38
At the other end of the admissions spectrum, so to speak, there is the
matter of using race-neutral factors that have the effect of targeting
minorities, such as residence and, for undergraduate admission, high school
class standing. Because of extensive residential racial segregation and
concentration, with racial minorities residing primarily in the central cities
of the nation's major metropolitan areas, admitting students on the basis of
residence would ensure the admission of at least some minority students.
Residential racial segregation and concentration produce a large number of
racially identifiable schools, so admitting students who reside in central
cities and who are in the top rank of their high schools will ensure the
undergraduate admission of a substantial number of African-American and
Hispanic students. As a practical matter, however, these would be low- and
moderate-income students generally attending lower-quality schools, who
would for the most part not be admitted to "elite" universities such as the
University of Michigan due to their relatively lower SAT and ACT scores. 39
When the Fifth Circuit in the Hopwood case4 ° held that race could not be
used in university admissions, the Texas legislature responded by enacting
a law entitling the top ten percent of every high school class to be admitted
to any university in Texas, including the flagship University of Texas at
Austin.41 After the voters in California adopted a state constitutional
38 For a discussion of the "cascading down" in the University of California
system following the ending of racial preferences, see James Traub, The Class of
Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
" In her concurring opinion in Grutter, Justice Ginsburg cited data showing that
over 70% of African-American and Hispanic children attended schools in which
minority students comprised a majority of the student body. She also cited data
showing that "schools in predominantly minority communities lag far behind others
measured by the educational resources available to them," and that "it remains the
current reality that many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and
unequal educational opportunities." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
' Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
41 See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES' ExPERIENCES 20
(2003).
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amendment prohibiting any use of race in governmental programs, the
University of California System responded by adopting a rule entitling the
top four percent of every high school class to be admitted to one of the
eight campuses of the system, but not necessarily the campus of the
students' choice.42 The substitution of the four percent rule for the use of
race-conscious admissions resulted in a decrease in the number of African-
American and Hispanic students at the flagship Berkeley and U.C.L.A.
campuses and an increase at the other campuses of the University of
California system. 3 The State of Florida also abolished the use of race in
university admissions, and provided that students who are in the top twenty
percent of their high school class and meet a second criterion based on
grade-point average are entitled to be admitted to the main state university
system."
For all of these reasons, when Grutter and Gratz came before the
Supreme Court, the stakes were not as high as when Bakke came before the
Court a quarter-century earlier. Not only had there been a quarter-century
of race-conscious admissions programs resulting in a substantial increase
in the number of minority lawyers, doctors, and other professionals and
some increase in size of the minority middle class and the number of better-
educated minority students, but the universities themselves were now
firmly committed to affirmative action.45 If the Court had held that race
could not be used in determining admissions, the impact would be felt
primarily by the more "elite" universities, and they could cushion the
impact a bit by using factors that may correlate with race, such as geo-
graphic residence; or factors designed to include a diverse cross-section of
students, such as, for undergraduates, high school class rank. Moreover,
such a decision would not affect the continued increase in the number of
minority lawyers, doctors and other professionals. It would mean only that
somewhat fewer of them would be coming from the elite law schools and
42 Id. at 20-21.
43 See Traub, supra note 38.
44 See HORN & FLORES, supra note 41, at 22. The authors contend that there is
insufficient evidence to suggest that percentage plans in Texas, Florida, and
California, even with other race-conscious processes, are effective alternatives to
the use of race and ethnicity as a factor in determining admissions. Id. at vii-x.
41 1 did not believe that this commitment was that strong at the time of Bakke,
and suggested then that if law schools could not continue to base admission on
existing academic standards, supplemented by a consideration of race, they might
well abandon affirmative action with the rationalization, "The Court made us do
it." See Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 4, at 344-45.
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medical schools and that in general fewer minorities would be graduating
from the elite universities."
But it was precisely for these reasons that the decision would be a very
important one for racial minorities and for the elite universities. If racial
minorities are truly to be full and equal participants in all important areas
of American life, this should include minority representation in substantial
numbers at the elite universities and at their law schools and medical
schools as well. Otherwise, the nation would be in danger of having a "two-
tier" system of higher education and "two-tier" professions, with white
university graduates, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals coming from
both "elite" and "non-elite" schools, and minority university graduates,
lawyers, doctors, and other professionals coming mostly from the "non-
elite" schools.47 And if the elite universities wanted to achieve substantial
diversity but were not permitted to use race in determining admission, they
would be forced to modify their standards by using factors such as
geographic residence and class rank, which can be used to ensure a cross-
section of ethnic backgrounds among admitted students. This policy would
probably result in somewhat fewer minority students and somewhat lower
admission standards, making these universities at the same time both less
diverse and less elite.
A final point to be noted is that the decision in Grutter-Gratz would be
limited to the constitutional permissibility of the use of race in determining
university admission and would not affect the Court's decisions dealing
with the constitutional permissibility of other uses of race for the benefit of
racial minorities.48 The issues before the Court in Grutter-Gratz were as
46 See Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preferences in Law School Admissions: The
Public Interest in a Diverse Legal Profession, 1 J.L. SOC'Y 17, 22-23 (1999).
" See id. at 22. The advantages of obtaining one's legal education at an elite
school were highlighted by Justice O'Connor in Grutter. Citing the amicus curiae
brief submitted by the Association of American Law Schools, she pointed out that
a handful of the more selective law schools accounted for 25 of the 100 United
States Senators, 74 United States Court of Appeals judges, and nearly 220 of the
more than 600 United States District Court Judges. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2341 (2003).
4 See the discussion, supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. On the
morning of the day that Grutter and Gratz were decided, I predicted in an op-ed
piece that regardless of the result, the decision would not reach beyond university
admissions. "That is because the Supreme Court has already resolved most of the
issues involving the use of race by the government, beginning with the Bakke case
in 1978." Robert A. Sedler, U-M Cases Won't Reach Beyond Schools, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, June 23, 2003, Editorial page.
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follows. First, is attaining a racially diverse student body a compelling
governmental interest, justifying the use of race-conscious admission
policies? Second, if so, are the University of Michigan Law School's race-
conscious admissions programs at the undergraduate level and in the law
school narrowly tailored to advance this interest?
The holding of the Court in Grutter-Gratz on each of these three issues
was as follows. First, and most importantly, the Court held that educational
diversity is a compelling governmental interest that can be advanced by the
university's competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin as one of
the factors in determining admission.4 9 Six Justices, O'Connor, joined by
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the Opinion of the Court in
Grutter, and Kennedy, in a dissent in that case, concurred in this holding.5"
Second, the Court held 5-4 in Grutter, that the law school's race-conscious
admissions program satisfied the competitive consideration of race and
ethnic origin test. Third, the Court held 6-3 in Gratz that the undergraduate
admissions program, which mechanically assigned a number of points for
different factors, including twenty points for being African-American,
Hispanic or Native American, and did not provide for individualized
consideration of all applicants, did not satisfy this test and thus was
unconstitutional. 51
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter expressly adopted and
reaffirmed the Powell opinion in Bakke. After reviewing at length the
Powell opinion, O'Connor stated: "For the reasons below, today we
endorse Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions."52 She
4' Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2325; Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
10 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337; id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Rehnquist
did not take a position on this issue, but recognized in his opinion in Gratz that the
Court had so held in Grutter and that this holding in Grutter controlled the result
in Gratz. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427. Scalia and Thomas, dissenting in Grutter, took
the position that educational diversity was not a compelling governmental interest.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2350-54 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
5 Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427-31. O'Connor joined in the Rehnquist opinion, and
wrote a concurrence, substantially agreed with by Breyer, in which she distin-
guished the undergraduate admissions program from the law school's on the
ground that it was based on a "mechanized selection index score and failed to
provide for meaningful individualized review." Id. at 2431-33 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens dissented on standing grounds. Id. at 2434-38
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Souter maintained that the plan was
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 2443-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
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first noted that while strict scrutiny applies to determine the constitutional-
ity of the university's use of race in determining admissions, strict scrutiny
is not "strict in theory, but fatal in fact, 53 and that in applying this test,
context matters. As she stated: "Not every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework
for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that
particular context."54 Quoting from the Powell opinion in Bakke, she
emphasized that in the context of higher education and taking into account
the First Amendment's academic freedom value, the strict scrutiny standard
did not preclude some judicial deference to the law school's educational
judgment that diversity was essential to its educational mission.55 This
claim was bolstered by the various amici briefs, including those from major
American businesses and high-ranking retired officers and civilian military
leaders, emphasizing the importance of diversity in training people to
operate in the global marketplace and in fulfilling the military's mission
respectively. 6 She went on to point out that law schools, particularly the
most highly selective, "represent the training ground for a large number of
our Nation's leaders,"57 and that "[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity."58 For all of these reasons, as she stated, "We endorse
Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions."59
Justice O'Connor then found that the law school's race-conscious
admissions program satisfied the "narrowly tailored" requirement of the
Powell opinion in Bakke, because the law school "engages in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse
educational environment."6 Justice Kennedy agreed that educational
53 Id. at 2338 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995)).
54 id.
55 Id. at 2339.56 Id. at 2340.
57 d. at 2341.
58 Id.
591 Id. at 2337.60 Id. at 2343. Justice O'Connor rejected the argument of the plaintiffs and the
United States as amici curiae that the plan was not narrowly tailored because
facially race-neutral means, such as residence and high school class rank, would
also achieve a diverse student body. She pointed out that there was no explanation
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diversity was a compelling governmental interest, but insisted, here
agreeing with the Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissents, that the law
school's race-conscious admissions program, with its emphasis on enrolling
a "critical mass" of minority students, operated in practice like a quota and
so failed the "narrowly tailored" requirement.61
In Gratz, the Court held 6-3, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
that the university's undergraduate admissions program failed the narrow
tailoring requirement.62 There was no individualized consideration of the
applicants at all, let alone the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin. Instead, the university mechanically assigned a number of points for
different factors, including twenty points for being African-American,
Hispanic or Native-American. As Rehnquist noted:
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke emphasized the importance of
considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the
qualities that individual possesses, and in turn, evaluating that individual's
ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education. The
admissions program Justice Powell described, however, did not contem-
plate that any single characteristic automatically ensured a specific and
identifiable contribution to a university's diversity.63
The Constitution does not permit a university to "achieve diversity on the
cheap."' If the university is going to take race or ethnic origin into account
as to how such plans would work for graduate and professional schools, and that
in any event, such plans could "preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just
racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university." Id. at
2345. She also emphasized that narrow tailoring does not mandate that a university
choose between "maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment
to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups." Id. at 2330.
In rejecting the argument that the law school could admit minority students by
using a lottery system or decreasing the emphasis on undergraduate GPA and
LSAT scores, she stated that "these alternatives would require a dramatic sacrifice
of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or both." Id. at 2345.
61 Id. at 2370-73 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003).
63 Id. at 2428.
"As I said in a newspaper interview the day after the decisions were rendered,
"U-M's [undergraduate] point system was trying to 'achieve diversity on the cheap.
Instead of hiring a large number of admissions officers U-M does this mechanically
and enters factors into a computer."' David Zaman & Maryanne George, U-M
Hails Top Court's Support of Race Factor, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 24, 2003,
at 1A, 4A.
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as one of the factors determining admission, it must hire a large number of
admissions officers to ensure that each application receives individualized
consideration for all of the diversity factors.
The end result of the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter-Gratz is, as
I said in a newspaper interview the next day: "'We are where we were
yesterday.... Nothing has changed except now we have certainty rather
than ambiguity."' 65 The Powell opinion in Bakke has now been adopted by
the Court. The applicable constitutional doctrine is that educational
diversity is a compelling governmental interest. A university may take race
into account as one of the factors in determining admission, but it must
provide individualized consideration for all of the applicants. Universities
revised their admissions policies after Bakke to comply with the approach
set forth in the Powell opinion; similarly, after Grutter-Gratz, universities
will revise their admission policies to conform to the requirements set forth
in the O'Connor opinion in Grutter and to avoid the pitfalls set forth in the
Rehnquist opinion in Gratz.
The Court's holding in Grutter-Gratz enables universities to take race
into account in determining admission and, to that extent, to continue the
progress of the last quarter-century in increasing the number of minority
college graduates, lawyers, doctors, and other professionals. This nation
will continue to move closer to achieving the full and equal participation
of racial minorities in all areas of American life. Justice O'Connor
hopefully opined in Grutter, "We expect that 25 years from now, the use
of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today."66 In any event, as a result of the Court's holdings in
Grutter and Gratz, the nation's universities will continue to reflect the
diversity of the nation itself.
65 Brad Heath, Court's Ruling Bows to History, DETROIT NEWS, June 24, 2003,
at A5.66 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.

